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Regulatory reform in public transport has become one of important issues in many countries, in order to 
improve efficiency and provide better services to users. Since regulatory reform will bring about institu-
tional and structure changes of the organization, then it will imply the way of the public transport services 
regulated and managed.  
This paper highlights how public transport service is organized under service contracts system, as one of 
growing trends recently. That is to say a system of which the service delivery of public transport is con-
ducted by business enterprise on specified target which is planned by authority, which works under contract 
agreement between them.  
The study focuses on the two cases namely both London’s and Seoul’s models. These will illustrate how 
they are put into practice in those cities. It could be significant as an alternative in undertaking local public 
transport reform efficiently.  
 





Recently, many local public transport agencies 
are trying to improve efficiency and provide better 
services of their public transport. Regulatory reform 
is one of growing options for these purposes. Indeed, 
there are various underlying reasons which are con-
fronted by them each, such as the reducing of gov-
ernment funding for public sector, the changes of 
regulations in the provision of public transport, or 
other reasons concerned with the improvement of 
services quantity and quality. 
The extensive evidence internationally showed 
that subsidized public transport services, provided on 
a monopoly basis by government’s operators in both 
developed and less developed countries tended to 
become inefficient1). They were partial to produce 
services for more than necessary (at above competi-
tive rates), and service quality was often inferior2). 
The experiences when such services were opened to 
competition, usually through a competitive tendering 
and contracting process, were that substantial cost 
savings were achieved3). In the mean time, the using 
of deregulated system in the provision of public 
transport in some large cities, showed the drawbacks 
in several aspects, mainly related to the market fail-
ure4). 
In many countries, governments are pushing for 
the introduction of competition in the organization of 
public services and more broadly in public pro-
curement5). The development of public-private 
partnerships around the world is a good illustration 
of this trend6).  Moreover, the emerging of new hy-
brid model which is implemented in some countries 
around the world over the last three decades has been 
one of alternative choices in the provision of public 
transport service. In other word, a model of which 
the public and private sectors share responsibility in 
delivering the service7). 
The service contract system is one of the growing 
trends under hybrid model.  The main feature of the 
system which is intended here is that the public 
transport services are planned by a public agency, 
and procured from business enterprises under service 
contracts, often with competitive tendering8). In ad-
dition, although this system works under contract 
 agreement between government as authority and 
business enterprises as operators but then authority 
takes active responsibility for planning of the service. 
This paper focuses on discussing of this kind of 
system. In a rather simpler way, the term of service 
contract system will then be used to represent such a 
system hereafter. 
In view of the regulatory reform is a process of 
change, it will bring about the institutional changes 
or rule of the game, even in public transport sector. 
Consequently the functions of each stakeholder 
would also be changed. The new institutional setting 
including the applying of service contract system 
creates new roles for all actors to run the system. 
This will also change the structure of the public 
transport organization itself. Thus, in the context of 
public transport service, it will imply and influence 
the way of the services to be provided, so become 
important to organize it within an efficient manner.  
This paper studies how the public bus transport 
service is organized in such an organizational form, 
as explained previously. The two cases, both Lon-
don’s and Seoul’s model are used as illustration. It is 
preceded by explaining the shifts toward the service 
contracts system in those cities respective. This is 
then followed by highlighting the organizing of 
public bus transport services under such systems in 
the cities, which covers some aspects namely plan-
ning, operating, and monitoring. In turn, it could be 
worthwhile as input for local public transport in 
conducting regulatory reform.  
 
2. THE SHIFTS TOWARD SERVICE 
CONTRACTS SYSTEM IN LONDON 
AND SEOUL 
Both London’s and Seoul’s cases are interesting 
to study since they had difference backgrounds in 
introducing the service contracts system into their 
public transport service. Moreover, their previous 
systems in the provision of public transport service 
were different each other. In case of London, its 
regulatory framework in public transport has 
evolved over the last three decades. It has moved 
toward new system by introducing competitive ten-
dering and undertaking the privatization of its pub-
licly owned bus company gradually. It was very 
different from the Seoul’s experience in conducting 
its innovative public transport reform, which was 
prepared in a short time, only around two years, 
before going into operation in the year 2004.  
In historical perspective on regulatory reform of 
the bus industry, the United Kingdom led the way in 
significantly deregulating the urban and rural public 
transport market when it introduced the 1985 
Transport Act9). Under the Act there are two distinct 
systems in providing public bus transport services 
through all The United Kingdom. The provision of 
public bus transport services for local and regional 
areas outside London is on the basis of unregulated 
system. This means that the initiative to run public 
bus transport services for passenger comes from 
private companies. They can apply and choose 
routes, arrange timetable and fare to be charged, 
based on a commercial basis.  
At variance with outside London, bus service in 
London is operated by private bus companies as 
operators, which work under contract to London 
Buses (LB), a subsidiary of Transport for London 
(TfL). In addition, TfL is a functional body that re-
sponsible for delivering the Mayor of London’s 
Transport Strategies. LB manages bus services, by 
planning routes, specifying service levels and en-
suring the quality of services, and also responsible 
for providing other support services, such as bus 
stations, and bus stops. The contracts are awarded to 
private companies through a competitive tendering 
process, as a selection mechanism.  
Previously, the provision of London's public bus 
service was a publicly owned and subsidized bus 
operation. Its service operation was an increasingly 
costly public monopoly at that time. Under the 
London Regional Transport Act 1984, London 
Transport (LT), which was then replaced by a new 
organization called TfL in 2000, was required to set 
up subsidiary companies to run both bus and under-
ground. It was also demanded to introduce competi-
tive tendering to ensure LT operated economically 
and required less financial assistance from public 
funds. In 1985 LT set up a subsidiary known as 
London Buses Limited (LBL), which was then split 
into 13 locally based subsidiaries companies. In the 
same year, LT also set up the Tendered Bus Division 
to begin the process of competitive tendering. In a 
consequence of the Act, LBL had to compete with 
private bus companies in order to get the right to run 
public bus transport service.  Finally, LBL was sold 
to private sector in 1994, and all of public bus 
transport services are run by private companies after 
that. The introduction of competition for the market 
and the involvement of the private sector had there-
fore been gradual in London6).  
The average number of bus passenger in London, 
carried per day, had increased by 46.92% since 1985, 
up from 3,124,658 passengers to 5,886,800 passen-
gers in 200810). Most of the increase occurred after the 
privatization. Moreover, based on his study on the 
deregulation in bus systems of the UK’s metropoli-
tan areas, White found the indication that total op-
erating costs declined by 10.5% in London11). The 
reduction in operating cost had been wholly swal-
lowed up by subsidy cuts and mileage increase12). 
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 under joint revenue management system, the SMG 
retains fare revenue, and operators are secured the 
reimbursement in compliance with total distance of 
service, according to bus operation each. In addition, 
in case of shortage, the SMG will subsidize bus op-
erators. Table 2 shows some aspects of competitive 
tendering and contract system in London and Seoul. 
Due to the authority retains fare revenue of bus 
operation then it involves the central pooling of fare 
revenues, and payments to operators which con-
cerned with the services and performance which is 
delivered. Consequently, there must be agency that 
responsible for collecting and distributing it. In 
London and Seoul, such tasks are carried out by a 
traffic card company in behalf of authority, in this 
matter TfL and the SMG.  
Under GCC, despite the risk of service produc-
tions is transferred to private companies, but then 
they are still protected from full commercial risk, 
since revenue risk is born by authority. It is different 
from net cost contract where operator bears both 
production and revenue risk. The while under man-
agement contract, both production and revenue risk 
are borne by authority18). The type of contracts on the 
Table  2 Competitive tendering and contract system in London and Seoul. 




• Route tendering system for entire      
network 
• Route tendering system for trunk lines 
only 
Executor of CT • LB as subsidiary of TfL • The team of SMG 
The number of 
operator 
• Increase, since enables potential op-
erators to take part in the process of 
CT 
• Reduce, since some operators had to 
form consortium to take part for CT  
Process of CT   • Competition was between private and 
public companies before privatization
• Apply pre-qualification system, be-
fore issuing Invitations to Tender 
(ITT) to             approved operators 
• Work on division of the greater          
metropolitan area into four zones,     
centering on the public bus depots 
• Comprised of 19 routes, with 2 ten-
dered bid in each zone when it was 
introduced 
Evaluation crite-
ria of CT 
• The best value for money, taking         
into account of quality and safety        
by Quality Incentive Contract  
• Operating cost, service and                    
operation plans 
Contract system • The Quality Incentive Contract which 
is the extension of Gross Cost Con-
tract 
• TfL retains fare revenue, contract       
payments related to mileage operated  
and overall reliability of the service 
• Under joint management of revenue, 
SMG retains fare revenue, and reim-
burse bus operators based on total 
distance of service per vehicle 
• Shortage will be subsidized by SMG 
Contract period • A 5 year contract with possibility to a 2
year extent based on performance 
• A 6 year contract for trunk lines which 
are put for tendering system 
 
Table  3 The type of contracts based on the division of risks between authority and operator. 
Type of Contracts Production risk: Revenue risk: 
Authority Operator Authority Operator 
Gross Cost Contract  √ √  
Net Cost Contract  √  √ 
Management Contract √  √  
 
 basis of the division of risks between contracting 
parties, both authority and operator, in the provision 
of public bus transport service can be seen in Table 
3.  
However, in London, there was an attempt to 
transfer the both risks to operators under net cost 
contract, which was applied in preparation for the 
privatization of its publicly owned company, London 
Bus Limited (LBL), until routes were tendered. It 
was not only to shift the revenue risk to the operators 
but also gave them the incentive to generate more 
revenue by increasing the quality of the services. 
Initially this contract system was not subject to 
competition as the routes were allocated to the in-
cumbent operators by negotiating. However, this 
trial seemed not successful, and only gross cost 
contracts have been offered since 199919). 
Concerned with the contractual form, the time 
period of contract should be considered as well. 
Under Quality Incentive Contract, LB signs up the 
contract with operator for a 5 year contract with the 
possibility to a 2 year contract extension on the basis 
of operator’s performance. In Seoul, under competi-
tive tendering, all contracts are signed for finite time 
period of 6 years. The longer contract term will allow 
for the bidder to offer the low price related to scale 
economies, but reduce the opportunity for competi-
tion amongst potential operators.   
 
(3) Monitoring of bus services  
The monitoring is an important part in manage-
ment cycle, including public transport sector. This is 
being more significant as the right of operating pub-
lic transport service is left to some operators. Under a 
gross cost regime, operators always have an incen-
tive to supply less than the contracted amount of 
service, so the agreement needs to be enforced19). 
Thus, the establishment of an efficient monitoring 
system is required to ensure bus services are pro-
vided as defined target. Further, it could also be used 
as feedback for policy formulation and development 
to provide better public transport services to citizen 
as users.  
As part of efforts to maintain the quantity and 
quality of public transport service which is provided, 
there are various monitoring systems which have 
 
Table  4  Bus monitoring systems in London.  
Monitoring 
System 





Lost mileage within 
operator control 
• Compare to contract agreement London Bus 
(LB) 
Yes 
Reliability Operator’s ability 
to schedule 
• Roadside survey  about regularity 
and punctuality of service (3-5% 
of the whole services) 
 LB Yes 
Driver and  
vehicle  
delivery  
Service quality  in 
compliance with 
contract 
• Mystery traveler survey, covers: 
9 Static audit, survey at bus stands
9 Mystery shopping survey  
Research 
agency in 
behalf of LB 
Yes 
Driver quality  Driving skill of 
driver 
• Covertly assessment 











• Regular check of 25 % of each 
operator’s fleet the whole year    
• The average number of point per 










• Interview,  includes: safety and 
security, information, reliability, 




Public information • Made by  phone, email and letter 






pliance with the 
specifications in 
the contract 
• Regular visits to operating garag-
es, focus on administration sys-
tem, handling and accounting for 
bus revenue and LB’s owned 
equipment 
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 tasks, but also to procure the service from operators, 
manage bus operation, and monitor the service pro-
vided by operators.  
Despite both London and Seoul apply service 
contract systems under control of local level author-
ity directly, however, the structure of organization 
which is responsible for planning, procuring, and 
monitoring the service in those cities emerge in dif-
ferent forms practically. Indeed, it is concerned with 
the underlying acts and process of the reform itself. 
All of such functions are held and coordinated by 
London bus in London. The while, in Seoul, to do so, 
the SMG is assisted by some specific organizations 
and competence authority. Moreover, the Seoul Bus 
Association, who represents the interest of bus 
companies in Seoul, plays a part in bridging the co-
ordination between bus operators and the SMG.   
With the total number of routes which is great, 
round about 700 routes, LB holds competitive ten-
dering every 2-4 weeks.  Therefore, it seems to be 
reasonably the present of LB as particular organiza-
tion in handling such functions of public bus 
transport services in London. This is not only re-
sponsible for enforcing continued tendering but also 
executing other tasks concerning planning, operating, 
and monitoring of bus service in London. 
Under a quasi public system, not all bus routes are 
put on competitive tendering system in Seoul. As a 
new concept, part of the reform, competitive ten-
dering was just applied for 19 routes (5.2% of total 
number of routes), when it was first introduced. It 
was just applied for trunk lines, while for the feeder 
lines, public bus service operation is still run by a 
large number of private companies that work based 
on agreement with the SMG under joint revenue 
management.  This system is adopted as a new rule in 
Seoul, results from consensus of the interested par-
ties who involved in the reform process, particularly 
the SMG and the Seoul Bus Association who played 
leading roles in the reform process.  
Indeed, the establishing of organization to plan, 
manage and coordinate the whole services should 
consider the efficiency and effectiveness of its func-
tion. Since, it requires additional budget allocation 
from authority to support the operation of the or-
ganization. The choosing of organization form could 
be associated with task’s function and responsibility, 
including the size of area to be served, the complex-
ity of service, and the usage of kind of technology 
just like the scientific bus operation system which 
has been applied in Seoul. 
In term of the competitive tendering system as a 
selection mechanism to designate operators to run 
public bus services, it has been successful in London. 
Direct savings from competitive tendering have av-
eraged 15 to 20 percent21). In the meantime, London 
Transport found that competitively tendered service 
had  generally higher quality, and that when the 
public operator provided service in a competitive 
environment (faced with the threat of contract can-
cellation, like private carriers), service quality im-
proved on the same services2).  The while, competi-
tive pressure from tendering process leads to situa-
tions in which operators must innovate in order to be 
competitive in the market22). This indicates that 
competitive tendering is not only could increase 
production cost efficiency through direct saving as a 
result of its process but also enhance service quality. 
Further, for the authority it could reduce asymmetry 
information as some operators offer the best com-
petitive price and quality of service, in order to get 
the right to run the services on the certain routes. 
In the context of monitoring system, in London, 
under quality incentive contract, the reliability of 
service, concerning both regularity and punctuality 
of service provided by operators, is measured by 
carrying out roadside survey. It is very different as 
compared to Seoul, which has applied the using of 
appropriate technology for such functions. By uti-
lizing an intelligent transport system (ITS), global 
positioning system (GPS), and using a sophisticated 
fare collection system, it could be conducted effec-
tively. Under this system, authority can also monitor 
the safety of bus service operations, and analyze the 
statistic performance of bus companies by utilizing 
smart card’s recorded data and others related infor-
mation. All of available information will be analyzed 
by TOPIS, and then used by the SMG as considera-
tion in decision making policy for better service to 
community as users. This system is not only to help 
in creating flexible and efficient control over inte-
grated public transport, but also in ensuring demand 





This paper focuses on the study of organizing of 
local public transport service, based on London’s 
and Seoul’s experiences. This describes the two 
previous different systems of public bus operation, 
which move toward the service contract system, 
under various rational behind their reform respective. 
It shows that the previous systems of public bus 
operation both under public monopoly and unregu-
lated system run by a large number of private com-
panies are allowed for shifting toward such a system.  
The changes toward the new arrangement of 
public bus operation system in those cities were 
highly concerned with the underlying acts or regu-
lations and the processes which took effect in con-
ducting the reforms themselves. These determined 
 the way of the competence authorities to take initia-
tive to start, perform, and encourage the reform 
process to come up with their expected goals, and 
influenced the result itself as well. It became more 
relevant due to the reform process involved many 
interested parties.  
The separation of planning from operation under 
gross cost model which are applied in those cities 
shows the role of involved parties both authority and 
private operators clearly. Moreover, since authority 
more focuses on maximizing the service and dele-
gates operational right to provide public bus services 
to operators, so the availability of an effective or-
ganization and appropriate technology become sig-
nificant in supporting to run and control public bus 
services. Indeed in applying such a system, the so-
lution adopted by one city cannot be directly trans-
ferred to another city. However, it is important to 
recognize that local circumstance of an area is dif-
ferent individually.  Therefore it should be seen and 
put in particular situation of an area in question, 
including by linking it with policy objectives of the 
service provision, as is the case in London and Seoul. 
The information on service contracts system of their 
best practices, should be developed and fitted with 
real situation by making the best use of the ad-
vantages, things like competitive tendering system, 
the utilizing of appropriate technology for planning, 
managing, and monitoring of service, and consider-
ing obstacles to effective service contract system of a 
certain area, like institutional capacity, the availa-
bility of reasonably operators, and the choosing of 
procurement and contractual type as well. 
This study doesn’t come to the conclusion of 
which one is the better of those experiences. It is 
beyond of the scope of the study, in view of the 
backgrounds, the former systems, and the processes 
of change both in London and Seoul were different at 
all. The stressing is more given to the way of or-
ganizing public bus transport service in those cities 
each. Finally, it could be useful inputs and alterna-
tives in conducting local public transport reform 
under service contract with public planning.  
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